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Federal arrangements in Canada, as in other federal democratic polities, divide 
governmental jurisdictions between at least two levels of governance and therefore result 
in at least two levels of electoral competition.1 These discrete levels of electoral 
competition raise the question of relations between both parties and voters at the national 
and sub-national levels of electoral competition. The concept of federal and provincial 
integration in Canada addresses these questions by examining linkages that exist between 
parties and voters at the federal and provincial levels.  
 This paper explores a particular form of federal-provincial integration, behavioral 
integration, in Canada since 1993. It argues that the nature of electoral politics and the 
party system in Canada since 1993 cannot be fully understood without an understanding 
of the nature and extent of federal-provincial party integration that occurs within it, 
especially with regard to differences in such integration between different federal parties 
and provinces. It argues more specifically that the traditional conception of “Affiliation 
Integration,” where federal-provincial integration takes place largely between federal and 
provincial parties of identical partisan affiliation, is still largely valid despite the 1993 
electoral dealignment and the rise of two new parties in that election. In order to do so, 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Dr. Anthony Sayers, Christopher Northcott, and David de Groot for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
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the paper will first attempt to refine the term “federal-provincial integration” by 
constructing a typology of different forms of federal-provincial integration before 
reviewing the literature on the resulting four forms in Canada. In addition, this section 
will outline problems with the literature and how this paper addresses them. The second 
section will present the paper’s research design. In particular, it will outline the three 
measures of behavioral integration that will be utilized in the analysis section. The third 
section will test the paper’s hypotheses by measuring behavioral integration in a variety 
of forms. Finally, the paper will conclude by broadly evaluating federal-provincial 
integration in Canada since 1993 and by noting how a refined interpretation of such 
integration furthers our understanding of the Fourth Canadian Party System in general.  
 
Literature Review 
Federal-provincial integration might be defined simply as the linkages that exist between 
parties at the federal level and parties at the provincial level. The potential phenomenon 
that fall within such a broad definition, however, are both numerous and varied. As a 
result, it is necessary to be more precise in what form of integration is being addressed.  
 We can differentiate between forms of integration on the basis of two 
considerations: the primary entity addressed by the definition and whether it is the actions 
or the values of that entity that are being addressed. On the first basis, the entity 
addressed can be either a party as an organizational structure or an individual citizen. On 
the second basis, we can differentiate between entities on the basis of that entity's actions 
or values. Table 1 summarizes these different conceptions of federal-provincial party 
integration: 
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Table 1: 
Forms of Federal-Provincial Integration 
 
Primary Entity  
Party Individual 
Actions Organizational Behavioral Characteristics 
of Entity Values Ideological Cognitive 
 
 
Four distinct forms of party integration emerge from the typology presented above: 
organizational, ideological, behavioral, and cognitive.  
 Organizational integration is concerned with the actions rather than the values of 
parties. It treats parties as organizational structures rather than as ideological vehicles or 
repositories of values or policy and is therefore concerned with the formal and structural 
links between parties at the federal and provincial level.2 Writing on U.S. parties, 
Huckshorn et al. provide an organizational definition of integration: "Integration involves 
a two-way pattern of interaction between the national and state party organization."3 
Thorlakson concurs in her definition of party integration as "the organizational linkages 
between the state and federal levels of parties."4 
 Organizational integration is the dominant form of integration studied in the 
literature on federalism. This is partially because party organization has been an 
important variable utilized by scholars to explain centralization or decentralization of 
party systems, an important topic following William Riker's assertion that federal 
                                                 
2 Organizational integration treats parties as the “memberships organization” outlined by Katz and Mair. 
Katz, R., and Peter Mair. Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies. London: Sage, 1992. 5 
3 Huckshorn, Robert J., et al.. “Party Integration and Party Organizational Strength.” The Journal of 
Politics. 48 (1996). 980-991. 978 
4 Thorlakson, Lori. “Federalism and Party Organizational Adaptation: A Cross-National Comparison.” A 
presentation to the ECPR Joint Sessions. Grenoble, France. April 6-11, 2001. 2.  I am grateful to Dr. 
Thorlakson for allowing me to cite this paper.  
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stability is linked to decentralization of the party system.5 Examples of this work include 
Campbell Sharman's testing of Riker's thesis by examining (among other things) party 
discipline in Australian party organizations across national-state lines6, Donald Smiley 
engaging in a broad analysis of federal-provincial party relations in Canada in order to 
test Riker's thesis7, and Amir Abedi and Alan Siaroff explaining dissimilarity between 
national and land elections in Austria by pointing to the decentralized organization of one 
of the main parties.8 In addition, party organization has been widely utilized as a 
dependent variable in studies of federalism. Thorlakson, for example, explains 
organizational relations between national and sub-national parties by utilizing two 
institutional factors, "the degree of centralization of resources and the method of power 
division," as independent variables.9 Thorlakson also examines policy distance between 
parties, but focuses predominantly on organizational integration.10 
 Organizational integration has been a strong focus in the Canadian integration 
literature as well. Rand Dyck provides an example of a scholar that views integration as a 
whole primarily as organizational integration. Of the eighteen "factors measuring degree 
of integration" he presents, nine can safely be classified as measurements of 
organizational integration while another three could arguably be classified as such.11 In 
addition to Dyck, Edwin Black's pioneering study described the strains between the 
                                                 
5 Riker, William. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964. 
136 
6 Sharman, Campbell. “Discipline and Disharmony: Party and the Operation of the Australian Federal 
System.” Parties and Federalism in Australia and Canada. Ed. Campbell Sharman. Canberra: Federalism 
Research Centre, 1994. 23-24. 26-27 
7 Smiley, Donald. Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies. 2nd Ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1972. 76 
8 Abedi, Amir, and Alan Siaroff. “The Mirror Has Broken: Increasing Divergence Between National and 
Land Elections in Austria.” German Politics. 8:1 (April 1999) 207-227. 207 
9 Thorlakson, Lori. 2.  
10 Ibid. 6 
11 Dyck, Rand. “Links Between Federal and Provincial Parties and Party Systems.” Representation, 
Integration and Political Parties in Canada. Ed. Herman Bakvis. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991. 130 
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federal and British Columbia Conservative parties in largely organizational terms.12 
Organizational integration has also been the focus of studies that focus on the activities of 
party activists.13 For example, Henry Jacek et al. examine the behavior of party activists 
at both levels in Hamilton14 while David Rayside explores the extent to which federal 
arrangements were responsible for the behavior of Quebec Liberal activists at the federal 
and provincial level.15 
 Ideological integration is concerned with the values rather than the actions of 
parties.16 Compared to organizational integration, ideological integration is under-
studied. Two reasons for this might exist. First, beliefs are more difficult than actions to 
both conceptualize and observe. This problem is exacerbated for parties; party ideology, 
especially since the development of the catch-all party model, is potentially malleable. 
Indeed, the notion of ideological integration presupposes that parties possess sets of 
values, a view that some might disagree with.17 Second, federal arrangements provide a 
greater incentive for ideological divergence between federal and provincial parties than 
for ideological similarity simply because federal and provincial parties appeal to different 
electorates. Donald Smiley notes that "a common and unifying ideology is not an 
                                                 
12 Black, Edwin. “Federal Strains Within a Canadian Party.” Federalism in Canada: Selected Readings. Ed. 
Garth Stevenson. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989. 304-319. 
13 It might appear that studies of party activists belong in the behavioral integration rather than the 
organizational integration category. I place such studies in the latter category because the activities of party 
activists under study, unlike those of voters or citizens that are examined in behavioral integration studies, 
are being performed in the capacity of workers for party organizations. 
14 Jacek, Henry, et al.. “The Congruence of Federal-Provincial Campaign Activity in Party Organizations: 
The Influence of Recruitment Patterns in Three Hamilton Ridings.” Federalism in Canada: Selected 
Readings. Ed. Garth Stevenson. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989. 320-339 
15 Rayside, David M.. “Federalism and The Party System: Provincial and Federal Liberals in the Province 
of Quebec.” Federalism in Canada: Selected Readings. Ed. Garth Stevenson. Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1989. 354-384 
16 Ideological integration also addresses parties as the “membership organizations” outlined by Katz and 
Mair because it is this form of the party that accounts for how party policy is formulated. Katz, R., and 
Peter Mair. 5 
17 For example, see Clarke, Harold D., et al.. Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of 
Restructuring. 3rd ed. Toronto: Gage, 1996.  
Koop, Federal-Provincial Integration in the Fourth Canadian Party System 
 6
influence toward federal-provincial integration...the national and provincial wings 
conform to the...perceived requirements of electoral victory among their respective 
electorates."18 
 Nevertheless, studies have utilized different methods to examine ideological 
integration. To begin, both Dyck and Smiley examine ideological similarity between 
federal and provincial parties; Dyck requires "basic ideological similarity" for two parties 
to be considered integrated while Smiley requires "a common ideology" between the 
parties.19 Thorlakson proposes "the similarity of the ideology and policy programs of the 
federal and state parties" as one of three measures of integration.20 These, however, are 
largely non-rigorous and impressionistic measures.  Dyck, however, also utilizes policy 
disputes between federal and provincial parties as a measure of ideological integration 
while Smiley qualifies his earlier requirement by requiring that the ideology of integrated 
parties "distinguishes them from other parties in the political systems of both levels."21 
While these measures constitute improvements, they are impressionistic and demonstrate 
the difficulties inherent in examining ideological integration. Blake, employing a more 
sophisticated approach, argues that split-level identifiers may be motivated by ideological 
considerations since ideologically-similar parties at the federal and provincial levels are 
not always of an identical partisan designation.22  
 Ideological integration, as a form of integration based upon values, is important 
because it is a potentially persuasive independent variable in explaining party integration 
                                                 
18 Smiley, Donald (1972). 92 
19 Dyck, Rand. 162. Smiley, Donald (1972). 77 
20 Thorlakson, Lori. 6 
21 Dyck, Rand. 162. Smiley, Donald (1972). 77 
22 Blake, Donald. “The Consistency of Inconsistency: Party Identification in Federal and Provincial 
Politics.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. XV:4 (December 1982) 691-710. 710 
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based on actions. For example, sociological explanations to structured voting behavior 
over time would utilize ideological similarity between national and sub-national parties 
as an independent variable to explain behavioral integration between the two parties. For 
this reason, ideological integration should not be ignored despite the difficulties 
associated with its study. One potential avenue of such study might consist of applying 
Klaus von Beyme’s Familles Spirituelles framework to Canada at the federal and 
provincial levels.23 
 Behavioral integration is concerned with the actions of individuals as they relate 
to party integration. Given that I have previously classified activist activity as 
organizational integration24, the dominant action in the study of behavioral integration is 
voting.  
Behavioral integration exists in the Canadian integration literature, but studies 
examining this phenomenon are often restricted to very small samples, usually a single 
constituency in a single election, and are oftentimes concerned with discovering 
explanations for individual-level voting behavior rather than with federal-provincial 
integration. Two studies utilize the same research design in surveying voters in proximate 
federal and provincial elections: John Courtney and David Smith for Saskatoon in 196425 
and George Perlin and Patti Peppin for Eglinton and Wellington in 1967.26 In these cases, 
the authors were primarily concerned with vote-switching from one election to another. 
Exceptions to this tendency toward studies of such small scope, however, exist: Donald 
                                                 
23 Beyme, Klaus von. Political Parties in Western Democracies. Aldershot: Gower, 1985.  
24 See footnote 11.  
25 Courtney, John, and David Smith. “Voting in a Provincial General Election and a Federal By-Election: A 
Constituency Study of Saskatoon City.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. XXXII:3 (August 1966). 
339-353 
26 Perlin, George, and Patti Peppin. “Variations in Party Support in Federal and Provincial Elections: Some 
Hypotheses.” IV:2 (June 1971). 280-286 
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Blake briefly addresses British Columbians' propensity to vote for different parties at the 
federal and provincial levels, but does so partially to demonstrate differences between the 
federal and provincial party systems.27 Richard Johnston addresses dissimilarity between 
federal and provincial elections that occurred between 1908 and 1974, but his approach is 
flawed by the necessity of shared partisan designations between parties in his index of 
dissimilarity.28 
 Cognitive integration is concerned with the thoughts of individuals and how they 
relate to both federalism and federal and provincial parties. Research in this area has 
tended to consist of examinations of voter identifications at the federal and provincial 
level at the expense of other forms of research more interested in federal-provincial 
integration specifically.  
 Federal arrangements provide a unique challenge to the concept of voter 
identification: how does participation in two distinct political systems affect one's 
identification with parties? Does federalism encourage voters to develop unique cognitive 
orientations that are the result of "blending" of the two levels of governance, or does it 
encourage a "dual citizenship" mindset where voters see themselves as living in "two 
political worlds"? Samuel Beer contributed to the blending thesis with his view of 
representational federalism, within which he claims that federal voters possess "at all 
levels of government common symbols which focus sentiments of party identification 
and ideas of party principle." Within parties, sub-national sentiments "mutually reinforce 
                                                 
27 Blake, Donald. Two Political Worlds: Parties and Voting in British Columbia. Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1985. 137-138 
28 Johnston, Richard. “Federal and Provincial Voting: Contemporary Patterns and Historical Evolution.” 
Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life. Eds. David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon. 
Toronto: Methuen, 1980. 131-178. 156 
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one another, instead of merely finding expression in separate spheres."29 Marianne 
Stewart and Harold Clarke added precision to Beer's theory by arguing that performance 
evaluations and voter ID at both levels are intertwined: "Other-level performance 
evaluations influence the dynamics of party identification at a particular level of the 
federal system."30 On the other hand, Donald Blake, utilizing British Columbia as an 
example, argued that distinctive federal and provincial party systems and a large numbers 
of split-level identifiers resulted in the creation of two largely autonomous electoral 
arenas; with regards to the proximate federal and provincial elections in 1979 Blake 
claims that "they (British Columbians) appeared to make a complete distinction between 
the two elections."31  
 Any study of linkages between national and sub-national parties in federal states 
must seek out commonalities between these parties in order to provide either independent 
or dependent variables to explain degrees of integration between the two parties. In the 
Canadian literature, this commonality has overwhelmingly been identical partisan 
designation and, by default, the subsidiary similarities that have flowed from this. This is 
especially true in studies of organizational and ideological integration. For example, 
Dyck's wide-ranging article on integration in Canada (published in 1991), briefly 
describes organizational relationships between federal parties and provincial parties of 
different partisan affiliation, but treats these as deviant cases.32 The literature on 
behavioral and cognitive integration has included works on vote-switching and dual-level 
                                                 
29 Beer, Samuel. “Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America.” American Political Science 
Review. 72:1 (March 1978). 9-21. 15 
30 Stewart, Marianne C., and Harold D. Clarke. “The Dynamics of Party Identification in Federal Systems: 
The Canadian Case.” American Journal of Political Science. 42:1 (January 1998). 97-107. 97 
31 Blake, Donald (1982). 710 
32 Dyck, Rand. 132 
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identifiers respectively. But these works rarely situate such phenomenon within the wider 
spectrum of party integration, instead focusing on their relationships to, for example, 
voter instability and the decline of party identification.33 Indeed, such behavior has been 
associated with irrationality, provoking a protest of sorts from Donald Blake, who 
described dual-level identification as rational in certain circumstances.34 
 This preoccupation with partisan designation is a relic from the first three 
Canadian party systems where such designations were oftentimes literally true and, later, 
still meaningful predictors of integration between national and sub-national parties. Early 
Canadian parties were usually largely integrated parties that moved toward confederal 
and split status slowly.35 In fact, Edwin Black first made the point in 1965 that "Canada's 
major parties do not fit the model of unified country-wide parties with hierarchically 
inferior provincial subdivisions."36 Carty, Cross, and Young note that the third federal 
party system, which began in the 1960s, saw a "disentangling of federal and provincial 
party organizations" and alienation of parties from their counter-parts on the other level, 
even to the extent that "national and provincial party organizations of the same name 
(were) in opposing political camps."37 Donald Smiley traced the de-integration of parties 
of identical partisan designation by differentiating between an integrated party system 
where "national and provincial parties of the same designation" are integrated in all forms 
(excepting cognitive) and a confederal system where parties of the same name possess 
largely autonomous organizations, espouse largely distinct ideologies, and have 
                                                 
33 Clarke, Harold D., and Marianne C. Stewart. “Partisan Inconsistency and Partisan Change in Federal 
States: The Case of Canada.” American Journal of Political Science. 31 (1987), 383-407. 383 
34 Blake, Donald (1982). 692 
35 For a description, see: Stevenson, Garth. Unfulfilled Union. 3rd Ed. Toronto: Gage, 1989.  
36 Black, Edwin. 317 
37 Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young. Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2000. 23-24 
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"significantly different bodies of voter allegiance."38 He concludes from his analysis that 
"the Canadian party system has developed from the integrated form to confederalism."39 
Addressing the decline in integration between parties of identical partisan designation in 
1980, Johnston remarked that "In a province a party's ideological and power positions 
may differ radically between provincial and federal levels, and, to be consistent, a voter 
may have to switch between parties."40 A move away from integration on the basis of 
partisan designation clearly existed and reached its apex in the 1993 federal election, 
which spawned the fourth federal party system.41 However, it is not clear that federal-
provincial integration either on the basis of partisan designation or as a whole has 
declined in the fourth party system.  
 This paper seeks to address these problems as well as explore the nature and 
extent of federal-provincial integration in the fourth federal party system, particularly the 
comparative extent to which non-truncated and truncated federal parties integrate with 
parties at the provincial level. Of the four forms of integration, this paper seeks to help 
correct the imbalance of the literature by focusing on behavioral integration. In order to 
address the view that federal integration as a whole has declined as a result of the rise of 
truncated parties and the decline of more integrated parties in the fourth federal party 
system, this paper’s thesis is that Canadian federal parties continue to integrate voters 
more effectively through parties of identical partisan designation than through parties of 
different partisan designations.  
                                                 
38 Smiley, Donald. The Federal Condition in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987. 103-104 
39 Ibid. 117 
40 Johnston, Richard. 153 
41 The fourth Canadian party system was first advanced in: Carty, R.K., William Cross, and Lisa Young. 
Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000.  
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Research Design 
This section outlines the research design of the paper. In addition to outlining the 
methods that will be utilized in the paper’s analysis, it will also address potential 
weaknesses in the research design.  
 The intent of the paper is to examine behavioral integration in the fourth Canadian 
party system, which Carty, Cross, and Young define as beginning with the dealigning 
1993 federal election.42 In order to do so, I utilize survey data from the 1997 Canadian 
Federal Election Study, specifically the post-election mail-out survey.43 Respondents’ 
answers to two questions are utilized. These questions ask respondents, first, what party 
they voted for in the federal election and, second, what party they voted for in the last 
provincial election in their respective provinces. The second question relies upon 
respondents’ memory of the party they voted for in the last provincial election, which in 
turn results in lower response levels for this question.  
 Utilizing data from only the 1997 federal election and preceding provincial 
elections, however, may not accurately measure integration in the fourth party system as 
a whole. However, it does provide a measure of the character of integration following the 
collapse of the third party system. In addition, the results of the 2000 federal election 
demonstrate that the 1993 and 1997 federal elections were not simply deviating elections; 
rather, 1997 and 2000 demonstrated a solidification of both the number of parties in the 
new system and the strength of the two new parties rather than a return to the old two and 
a half party system and a potential resurgence of the two old parties. On this view, the 
1997 election, which followed the dealigning 1993 election, is the ideal first election to 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 3 
43 Data from the Canadian Election Study can be found at: <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces-
eec/ces.html> (November 19, 2002).  
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begin analyzing trends in federal integration in this new party system. A similar objection 
is that a set of single elections cannot be utilized because of the importance of short-term 
factors in determining voting choices.44 Voting in the fourth party system, however, has 
proven to be fairly structured. Stability existed between the 1993 and 1997 elections at 
the individual voting level: Neil Nevitte et al. found that “two out of three voters voted 
for the same party they had supported in 1993.”45 They subsequently explain this in light 
of different voting structures which are unique for each party.  
 Three measures of behavioral integration between federal and provincial parties 
will be used in the analysis section. The first is the percentage of a single federal party’s 
voters in a single province that also voted for a single provincial party, or the federal vote 
measure. For example, this measure for the federal Liberal Party and the B.C. Liberal 
Party is 49.3%. In other words, 49.3% of federal Liberal Party voters in B.C. also voted 
for the B.C. Liberal Party. This measure is helpful on a single-variable basis (when the 
percentage is calculated as a national rather than a provincial total), but is less useful 
when federal parties as a whole are utilized as the units of analysis because the measure is 
influenced by the number of provincial parties included in the measure. The second 
measure is the average percentage of selected provincial parties’ voters that also voted for 
a single federal party, or the average provincial vote measure. Using the previous 
example, the provincial vote score for the federal Liberal Party in their relationship with 
the B.C. Liberal Party would be 37.4%, or the proportion of B.C. Liberal voters that 
voted for the federal Liberal Party. This measure is applied to individual federal parties 
                                                 
44 Harold D. Clarke et al. summarize this argument: “…many voters respond to the highly volatile short-
term forces that define the substance of successive election campaigns.” Clarke, Harold D., et al.. 94 
45 Nevitte, Neil, et al.. Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election. Don Mills: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. 23 
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and has two advantages. The first is that, unlike the first measure, it can account for a 
federal party’s integrative relationships without being influenced by the number of such 
relationships. The second advantage is that the measure communicates a benefit for a 
federal party by summarizing the votes it receives from different provincial parties; thus 
it is accurate to say that a federal party that receives a higher value than another has been 
more “successful” in integrating voters between the two parties. The third measure is a 
statistical measure of correlation, Kendall’s tau-b. Tau-b measures both the strength and 
direction of the association between two variables. In addition, the measure is adaptable; 
it can be applied to relationships between both individual parties and different groups of 
parties. This measure is appropriate because the two questions outlined above were 
subsequently recoded into ordinal variables.  
 The first hypothesis requires that relationships between federal and provincial 
parties be distinguished between non-truncated (parties at different levels which are of 
the same partisan designation) and truncated (parties of different partisan designations) 
parties. Measuring integration between non-truncated federal and provincial parties 
requires simply utilizing parties of the same name. The measurement of integration 
between truncated parties, however, is more difficult, since criteria for selecting which 
provincial parties will be included in the analysis is required. For this paper, the threshold 
for provincial parties to be considered for a potential truncated voting relationship with a 
federal party is for it to receive 35% or higher on the federal vote measure. This threshold 
reflects that federal parties may integrate in a meaningful sense with more than a single 
provincial party in a single province, but is not so low as to render the measure 
essentially meaningless. In order to facilitate meaningful comparisons between non-
Koop, Federal-Provincial Integration in the Fourth Canadian Party System 
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truncated and truncated integration, non-truncated provincial parties that did not receive 
35% or higher on the federal vote measure were similarly deleted from the analysis.  
 
Analysis 
Appendix one summarizes the pairs of federal and provincial parties in significant 
integrative relationships which meet the 35% federal vote measure threshold. It also 
summarizes the relationship (non-truncated or truncated) and, if the relationship is 
truncated, then what provincial party is paired with the federal party; the federal vote 
measure of integration and the provincial vote measure of integration; and Kendall’s tau-
b measure of association between the vote shares of the two parties in the provincial 
(rather than the federal) electorate.  
In order to test the extent to which federal parties integrate voters through non-
truncated or truncated parties, the admissible relationships between federal and provincial 
parties must be divided into non-truncated and truncated categories. Table two presents 
the measures of integration for the federal parties’ non-truncated and truncated 
relationships. For these measures, the national electorate rather than provincial electorates 
are used: 
Koop, Federal-Provincial Integration in the Fourth Canadian Party System 
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Table 2: 
Non-Truncated and Truncated Voting Relationships 
 
 Non-Truncated Truncated 
Party Fed.46 
% 
Prov. 
% 
Tau b Sig. N Fed. 
%
Prov. 
%
Tau 
b 
Sig. N
Liberal 53.2 57.5 0.432 0.000 7 3.4 29.1 0.027 0.127 1
P.C. 41.6 29.6 0.259 0.000 5 26.7 15.8 0.080 0.000 4
N.D.P. 58.3 39.4 0.438 0.000 6 5.8 14.9 0.057 0.018 1
B.Q. 82.3 61.3 0.689 0.000 1 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---
Reform 13.9 78.7 0.229 0.000 1 43.8 28.1 0.229 0.000 8
Average 49.9 53.3 20 19.9 22.0  15
 
 In the case of the federal and provincial vote measures, non-truncated parties 
integrate voters to a greater extent than do truncated parties. For every federal party 
except Reform, voters for a federal party were more likely to vote for a provincial non-
truncated party then they were for a truncated party of a different partisan label. In 
addition, every voter for a provincial party was more likely to vote for a federal counter-
part with an identical partisan label rather than another party. Only federal Reform voters 
were more likely to vote for a truncated provincial party, and this low score may have 
resulted from there being only a single provincial Reform Party. Provincial Reform 
voters, however, were more likely to stick with the non-truncated federal Reform Party. 
The tau-b measure tells a similar story: all of the relationships between non-truncated 
voting are significant and (with the exception of Reform) higher than the relationship 
between voting for non-truncated paired parties. The exception is Reform voters, where 
an equal relationship between non-truncated and truncated voting existed. On the basis of 
these measures of behavioral integration, it must be concluded that parties integrate 
                                                 
46 Neither the federal nor the provincial vote percentages presented in this table are the federal or provincial 
vote scores described in the previous section. Rather they are the percentage of shared votes as a percentage 
of the national vote.  
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voters more effectively through non-truncated counter-parts at the different levels rather 
than through truncated parties at the other level.  
 Federal and provincial parties, however, integrate voters to differing extents and 
in different ways. To help determine differences in the nature and extent of integration 
between federal parties, such parties are classified according to: the number of 
relationships in general, the number of non-truncated and truncated links with provincial 
parties, the strength of these links, the imbalance between shared votes, and the territorial 
distribution of these integrative linkages. Table three summarizes some of these measures 
for the five federal parties: 
Table 3: 
Measures of Integration (By Party) 
 
 Non-
Truncated 
Links (%)
Truncated 
Links (%)
N Average 
Provincial 
Vote
Non-
Truncated 
Prov. Vote 
Truncated 
Prov. Vote
Liberal 7 (87.5) 1 (12.5) 8 50.8 53.9 29.1
P.C. 5 (55.6) 4 (44.4) 9 24.8 31.5 16.4
N.D.P. 6 (85.7) 1 (14.3) 7 42.1 46.6 14.9
B.Q. 1 (100.0) 0 (0.00) 1 61.3 61.3 ----
Reform 1 (11.1) 8 (88.9) 9 36.5 85.0 30.5
 
 The federal parties do not differ greatly in the total number of relationships they 
share with provincial parties; they range from a low of seven for the N.D.P. to a high of 
nine for the P.C. Party. The exception to this is the Bloc Quebecois, which operates only 
in Quebec and integrates voters only through the provincial Parti Quebecois. Differences, 
however, exist in the nature of these linkages. It is possible to differentiate between four 
groups of parties on the basis of nature of integration. First, the Bloc Quebecois’ single 
integrative relationship with the Parti Quebecois is non-truncated. Second, the Liberal 
Party and the N.D.P.’s integrative relationships are strongly non-truncated, with 87.5% 
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and 85.7% of such relationships being non-truncated respectively.  Third, roughly half 
(55.6%) of the P.C. Party’s integrative relationships are non-truncated. Finally, the 
Reform Party is almost a completely a truncated party, with 88.9% of its integrative 
relationships being truncated.  
 Referring to table two, the strength of these integrative relationships between 
parties also differs. The statistical relationship between BQ and PQ voters is the 
strongest. The Liberal Party and the N.D.P.’s non-truncated relationships are next 
strongest. The strength of the P.C. and Reform parties’ non-truncated relationships, 
however, is comparably low. The strength of truncated relationships as a whole is 
significantly lower than that of non-truncated relationships. The Reform Party exhibits 
the strongest truncated relationship, although it is only as strong as its non-truncated 
relationship. While statistical relationships between federal and provincial P.C. and 
N.D.P. voters exist, these relationships are weak. The result for the Liberal Party is not 
statistically significant while the B.Q. has no truncated integrative links.  
 The integrative relationships between the parties can also be measured with the 
provincial vote measure. The B.Q. receives the highest level of support from its one 
integrative relationship: the PQ. The Liberal Party was the next most likely to receive 
votes from provincial counterpart voters, followed by the N.D.P., Reform, and the P.C. 
Party. In all cases, federal parties are more likely to receive provincial support from their 
non-truncated counterparts then from truncated provincial party voters. This is especially 
true for the federal Reform Party, which received strong support from provincial voters 
for its one non-truncated relationship (B.C. Reform). In addition, the Liberal and Reform 
parties’ truncated provincial vote scores are significantly higher than the other parties’ 
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scores and are almost identical to one another. Both parties benefited from the support of 
voters for provincial parties that were in truncated integrative relationships. 
 Two dimensions of party integration result from this analysis. These are the extent 
of party integration (the number of significant linkages between parties) and the nature of 
this integration (whether it is non-truncated or truncated). Figure one plots the five 
federal parties on the bases of these considerations. The x value is determined by taking 
the percentage of total relationships for each party out of a potential total of ten (one for 
each province):  
Figure 1: 
Federal Parties Plotted by Number of Relationships and % of Truncated 
Relationships 
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 The five parties occupy three different cells on the diagram. The Bloc Quebecois 
has a low percentage of total links, but a high percentage of non-truncated linkages. The 
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Liberals, N.D.P., and P.C. parties have, to differing degrees, a high percentage of 
linkages in general and a high percentage of non-truncated relationships. The Reform 
Party, almost the mirror image of the Bloc Quebecois, has a high percentage of links but 
a low percentage of non-truncated parties. It appears that the integrative nature of the two 
party system invaders in 1993 was radically different from that of the traditional parties, 
and radically different from one another.  
 Do differences in the extent and nature of behavioral integration exist between the 
provinces? Table four summarizes the measures of integration utilized above but uses 
provincial boundaries as a method of differentiating between different integrative 
relationships:  
Table 4: 
Measures of Integration (By Province) 
 
Province Non-
Truncated 
Links (%) 
Truncated 
Links (%)
N Average 
Provincial 
Vote
Non-Truncated 
Provincial Vote 
Truncated 
Provincial 
Vote
B.C. 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 6 39.0 52.5 25.5
Alberta 3 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 4 49.5 48.2 53.4
Saskatchewan 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 6 31.7 31.0 32.4
Manitoba 3 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 4 44.9 52.6 21.6
Ontario 3 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 4 38.7 43.3 24.8
Quebec 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 5 32.1 61.4 12.5
Atlantic 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 6 30.8 51.7 10.0
 
 Significant differences in the numbers of integrative parties between the provinces 
do not exist. Only three groups can be differentiated in this regard: British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and the Atlantic provinces include six integrative relationships, Quebec 
has five, and Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario have four. Table five summarizes these 
groups: 
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Table 5:  
Provinces Included in Groups by Integrative Characteristics 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
British Columbia Quebec Alberta 
Saskatchewan  Manitoba 
Atlantic  Ontario 
 
These groups of provinces demonstrate similarity in the proportions of those 
relationships that are non-truncated and truncated. In all the provinces of the first group, 
half of the linkages are non-truncated while half are truncated. Quebec’s proportion of 
linkages is 60% for truncated and 40% for non-truncated. For all of the provinces in the 
last group, 75% of the relationships are non-truncated. Group one is therefore 
characterized by the highest number of relationships and a comparably moderate 
proportion of truncated links. Group two is characterized by a comparably moderate 
number of cases and a high proportion of truncated links. Group three is characterized by 
the lowest number of integrative relationships and the lowest proportion of truncated 
links. Figure two summarizes the average non-truncated and truncated provincial vote 
scores for these groups of provinces: 
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Figure 2: 
Non-Truncated and Truncated Provincial Vote Scores by Group 
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 With regards to non-truncated relationships, supporters of provincial parties in 
groups one and three were similarly likely to vote for the parties represented in those 
relationships at the federal level (45.1% and 48.0%). Group two (or Quebec) exhibits the 
strongest non-truncated relationship. Groups one and two differ in the strength of their 
truncated relationships; group three is significantly stronger in this area than is group one. 
Group two exhibits the weakest truncated provincial vote score and the greatest 
divergence between non-truncated and truncated relationships.  
 The above finding cautions against utilizing only the number of links in each 
province as a measure of integration in that province. On the provincial vote measure, 
group three integrated voters more effectively through both non-truncated and truncated 
relationships despite that the provinces in group three contained four significant linkages 
each while the provinces in group one contained six.  
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis and utilized to help 
further our understanding of the fourth federal party system. First, non-truncated 
integrative relationships between federal and provincial parties in general were stronger 
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than truncated relationships. Voters were still more likely to vote for parties of identical 
partisan affiliation at the federal and provincial levels rather than for parties of different 
partisan affiliations. Second, significant differences exist in the extent to which this is 
true for voters for the different federal parties. The five parties did not differ greatly in 
the number of significant integrative relationships they shared with provincial parties 
(with the exception of the B.Q., which shared only a single integrative relationship). They 
did, however, differ in the proportions of total significant non-truncated and truncated 
relationships, with the three older parties more likely to exhibit non-truncated 
relationships and the Reform Party more likely to exhibit truncated relationships. Third, 
differences exist between the character of provinces in the extent and nature of their 
integrative relationships. While group one provinces contain the highest number of 
linkages and the highest percentage of truncated relationships (excluding group two, 
which contains only a single province), group three provinces integrate voters in both on 
the basis of the provincial vote measure most effectively in both non-truncated and 
truncated relationships.  
 
Conclusion 
Carty, Cross, and Young point to two dealigning features of the 1993 federal election in 
particular in justifying their view that that election in Canada marked the emergence of a 
new party system. First, the 1993 election saw the decline in vote and seat shares for two 
older parties, the P.C. Party and the N.D.P., and the emergence of two new parties, the 
B.Q. and the Reform Party.47 Results from the 1997 and 2000 federal elections indicate 
                                                 
47 Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young. 6 
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that these results were not the product of a deviating election.48 Second, the Canadian 
Parliament was largely regionalized as the five parties “developed distinctly regional 
bases.”49 What are the results of this paper’s findings for this widely-accepted view of 
contemporary Canadian electoral politics? 
 First, the introduction of two new parties to the federal party system has not 
resulted in the replacement of “affiliation integration” with integration between truncated 
parties. Voters for federal parties are still more likely to vote for parties of identical 
partisan affiliation at the provincial level then they are for parties of different partisan 
identifications. Federal-provincial integration in the form of “affiliation integration” 
appears to be one string of continuity through the 1993 dealignment and the many 
significant changes to federal electoral politics that accompanied it.  
Second, the introduction of two new parties to the federal party system has altered 
traditional patterns in federal-provincial integration and resulted in significant divisions 
in both the extent and form of integration between federal parties. The Liberal Party, 
which has changed the least from the third party system, has retained a traditional base of 
voting relationships with non-truncated provincial counter-parts. The other older parties, 
the P.C. Party and the N.D.P., have similarly retained a large number of non-truncated 
voting relationships with provincial counter-parts, but these relationships are generally 
weaker than those of the Liberal Party. Decreased levels of electoral support for the P.C. 
Party and the N.D.P. are replicated in their patterns of integration. The comparably low 
levels of non-truncated integration between federal and provincial P.C. and New 
Democratic parties, particularly as demonstrated by their comparably low provincial vote 
                                                 
48 For an elaboration of this argument, see appendix 1.  
49 Ibid. 7 
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scores; demonstrate that these parties may not be able to count on votes from supporters 
of their provincial supporters in the future.50 Replicating the differences between the old 
and the new parties, the invaders differ greatly from both the old parties and one another 
in the extent and form of their integration with provincial parties. The Reform Party, 
while similar to the old-line parties in its number of integrative relationships with 
provincial parties, is an almost completely truncated party. The B.Q., on the other hand, 
while similar to the old-line parties in its low rate of truncation, shares an integrative 
relationship with only a single provincial party.51 Nor is this a result of these parties’ 
relative immaturity; both parties have demonstrated that they are committed to the current 
extent and forms of their integrative relationships.52 In this regard, then, as in others, the 
two new parties have altered electoral politics in Canada since 1993.  
Third, the regionalization of party support that became apparent in the 1993 
election has also been replicated in the extent and nature of integration in the different 
provinces, although these groups of provinces are not identical in their composition. 
Carty, Cross, and Young’s dominant regions include the west (especially British 
Columbia and Alberta where the Reform Party was strongest), Ontario (the Liberals’ 
primary base of support), and francophone Quebec (where the B.Q. was naturally 
                                                 
50 See table five. This point is well-illustrated by the non-truncated provincial vote scores for these parties. 
Only 31.5% of voters that cast their ballots for provincial P.C. parties voted for the federal P.C. Party, 
while this figure for the N.D.P. is 46.6%.  
51 For a graphical summary of the differences in these parties, see figure 1.  
52 The B.Q. naturally has no interest in creating relationships with parties outside of Quebec. The leadership 
of the Canadian Alliance and the Reform Party before it, on the other hand, has consistently opposed the 
creation of non-truncated provincial counter-parts. For an early example of both former Reform leader 
Preston Manning and Alliance leader Stephen Harper’s opposition to provincial counter-parts, see: 
Brunner, Paul. “The Provincial Question: An Alberta Temptation.” Alberta Report. July 9, 1990.  On the 
other hand, the Canadian Alliance has welcomed the possibility of creating new truncated relationships 
with different provincial parties. Tom Flanagan noted that “The Canadian Alliance will be a merger of the 
Reform Party with political activists from the provincial Liberal Party of British Columbia, the 
Saskatchewan Party, and several provincial Progressive Conservative Parties.” Flanagan, Tom. “From 
Reform to the Canadian Alliance.” Party Politics in Canada. 8th Ed. Eds. Hugh G. Thorburn and Alan 
Whitehorn. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001. 280-291. 290 
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strong).53 While the N.D.P. and the P.C. Party lacked strong regional bases, both these 
parties became competitive in the Atlantic region in the 1997 election. Regions based 
upon patterns of integration, however, cut across these party lines. B.C., Saskatchewan, 
and the Atlantic region were characterized by both a high number of linkages and a 
comparably high rate of truncated linkages. Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario were 
characterized by a lower number of linkages and a lower rate of truncated linkages, but 
these relationships in general were stronger than in the other provinces. It would appear 
that the first group of provinces has moved further from the traditional model of 
“affiliation integration” than the second, and that the resulting high number of truncated 
linkages has weakened integration in general in these provinces as a result of the 
generally weaker nature of truncated relationships compared to non-integrated 
relationships.54 Whether the first group is more “developed” in its apparent movement 
away from the traditional model of integration, however, remains to be seen. A 
strengthening of truncated relationships in the first group and a movement toward more 
truncated relationships in the second group would substantiate this view.  
The conclusions that have been drawn from this paper’s analysis are limited by 
the paper’s focus on the behavioral form of integration and its confinement to the 1997 
federal election and preceding provincial election. Its conclusions could be either further 
substantiated or challenged by expanding this paper’s scope to other forms of integration 
or to different elections since 1993. Federal-provincial integration in Canada, while 
affected by the 1993 electoral realignment, contains themes of both continuity and 
change. In both cases, the examination of federal-provincial integration contributes to an 
                                                 
53 Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young. 7 
54 See table 2 and the following discussion.  
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understanding of Canada’s new party system and to the discussion of current federal 
electoral politics. Further changes to patterns of integration are likely to follow further 
changes to the federal party system as a whole, adding another dimension of importance 
to the discussion of the 1997 and 2000 elections as either deviating or realigning 
elections.  
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Appendix 1: Individual Voting Relationships by Province 
 
Province Federal 
Party 
Provincial 
Party 
Federal 
Vote 
Provincial 
Vote
Tau b Sig.
British 
Columbia 
Liberal \ 49.3 37.4 0.234 0.000
 N.D.P. \ 92.3 35.0 0.478 0.000
 Reform \ 38.6 85.0 0.379 0.000
 Liberal N.D.P. 43.5 29.1 0.160 0.000
 P.C. Liberal 69.2 9.9 0.165 0.000
 Reform Liberal 38.6 37.4 0.127 0.003
Alberta Liberal \ 62.9 50.0 0.435 0.000
 P.C. \ 85.2 19.5 0.284 0.000
 N.D.P. \ 69.2 75.0 0.634 0.000
 Reform P.C. 59.4 53.4 0.241 0.000
Saskatchewan Liberal \ 66.7 47.1 0.367 0.000
 P.C. \ 40.0 10.5 0.072 0.370
 N.D.P. \ 92.3 35.3 0.468 0.000
 P.C. N.D.P. 40.0 5.9 0.066 0.410
 Reform P.C. 46.2 60.0 0.361 0.000
 Reform N.D.P. 42.3 31.4 0.109 0.175
Manitoba Liberal \ 50.0 72.7 0.398 0.000
 P.C. \ 86.7 35.1 0.414 0.000
 N.D.P. \ 82.4 50.0 0.559 0.000
 Reform P.C. 66.7 21.6 0.208 0.011
Ontario Liberal \ 56.5 65.7 0.400 0.000
 P.C. \ 81.0 28.0 0.325 0.000
 N.D.P. \ 73.0 36.2 0.437 0.000
 Reform P.C. 60.1 24.8 0.221 0.000
Quebec Liberal \ 87.5 61.5 0.589 0.000
 B.Q. \ 96.5 61.3 0.591 0.000
 P.C. Liberal 51.4 20.6 0.149 0.000
 P.C. P.Q. 44.8 14.7 0.056 0.050
 N.D.P. Liberal 60.0 2.3 0.024 0.394
Atlantic Liberal \ 95.2 42.6 0.500 0.000
 P.C. \ 67.9 64.4 0.449 0.000
 N.D.P. \ 37.1 48.1 0.234 0.000
 N.D.P. Liberal 40.0 14.9 -0.025 0.677
 Reform Liberal 46.2 6.4 -0.007 0.912
 Reform P.C. 38.5 8.6 0.074 0.215
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